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Editorial

From Res Cogitans to Digital Twins: Large Language Models, Large World Models, and the Illusion of Consciousness in the Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu Singularity

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De Res Cogitans a Gemelos Digitales: Grandes Modelos de Lenguaje, Grandes Modelos de Mundo y la Ilusión de Conciencia en la Singularidad del Jiu-Jitsu Brasileño

INFO. ARTÍCULO

The Pauline assertion recorded in the Acts of the Apostles— *In ipso vivimus et movemur et sumus* ("In Him we live and move and have our being")—offers an unexpected yet formidable heuristic framework for diagnosing the

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evolutionary state of Artificial Intelligence. Accepting this triad as an ontological map, it becomes evident that contemporary technology has conquered the *vivimus*: Large Language Models (LLMs) have solved the challenge of *logos*, emulating linguistic intelligence with a syntactic competence we frequently mistake for semantics [1].

We now stand at the threshold of a second revolution: the conquest of the *movemur*. The emergence of Large World Models and humanoid robotics suggests that physical action and dynamic navigation are nearing solution. To illustrate this milestone, I propose the concept of the "Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu Singularity" (BJJ-S). Unlike Chess or Go, BJJ demands management of a continuous state space, extreme proprioception, and real-time adaptation against an intelligent, hostile opponent. The BJJ-S represents the hypothetical moment when an autonomous robotic system defeats a human black belt in open combat. Such achievement would arguably solve spatial and embodied intelligence. Yet success in the *vivimus* and *movemur* does not advance us toward the *sumus*: conscious existence.

Examination of the artificial mind returns us to the Cartesian distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa* [2]. Current precision medicine, aspiring to create "Digital Twins," implicitly adheres to data materialism: the assumption that we are computable biological systems and that replicating the *res extensa in silico* will generate mental function as byproduct. This view suggests that if the brain operates analogously to a Turing Machine, the substrate—carbon or silicon—becomes irrelevant [3].

We must guard against the inverse of the category mistake denounced by Gilbert Ryle. While Ryle attacked the "ghost in the machine" [4], we now risk assuming that a perfect machine will automatically generate a ghost. Alan Turing proposed that indistinguishable behavior compels us to concede intelligence [5]. Yet John Searle, through his Chinese Room argument, demonstrated that symbol manipulation (syntax) does not engender understanding (semantics) [6]. A medical LLM processing the token "intractable pain" performs brilliant statistical operations while inhabiting an ontological abyss: it does not feel pain.

Even achieving the BJJ Singularity—robots moving with supra-human grace—will not resolve what David Chalmers termed the "Hard Problem" of consciousness [7]. Cognitive functions such as discrimination, reporting, and motor control constitute "easy" engineering problems. The mystery persists: why are these functions accompanied by subjective experience? Why is there something it is like to be that system? Thomas Nagel reminded us that objective description of a bat's neurophysiology would never reveal what it feels like to be a bat [8]. Knowing the weights of a neural network will not reveal if "anyone is home." Future AI systems, regardless of physical or verbal prowess, may remain "philosophical zombies": behaviorally identical to us, yet internally dark, devoid of qualia.

The implications for medicine prove profound. Diagnostic AI will outperform clinicians in pattern recognition (*vivimus*) and surgical robotics will execute procedures with superhuman precision (*movemur*). However, moral agency and ethical responsibility require consciousness, not mere competence. A machine cannot yet be a moral agent because it lacks the capacity to be a subject of experience.

The physician of tomorrow will not be defined by information processing—a domain already surpassed—but by the irreducibly human capacity to feel, to suffer-with, and to render illness humanly meaningful. As Mary Midgley observed, "we are not just rather like animals; we are animals" [9]. AI systems, however sophisticated, constitute a different class of entity. In the age of algorithms and advanced robotics, the *sumus* remains our exclusive and non-transferable domain.

1. CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

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